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RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
The plaintiff-respondent, Henry Maas, contests the 
defendant-appellant, Utah Bank & Trust's petition for rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential thrust of the defendant-appellant's petition 
for rehearing is that no commercially unreasonable disposition of 
the subject truck occurred because the defendant-appellant Bank 
merely afforded Kenneth Allred the right to redeem the collateral. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Appellant's Petition for Rehearing p.5. The appellant-Bank 
claims the collateral was redeemed by Kenneth Allred even 
though his father, Arvel Allred, paid the balance owing on 
the note relevant to this lawsuit. Id. 
Plaintiff-respondent strongly disputes that Kenneth 
Allred ever redeemed the collateral. Kenneth Allred specifi-
cally denied that he asked his father to pay off the outstanding 
balance (Tr. 127). He further denied that Arvel Allred's 
making the payoff was in his behalf (Tr. 132). Arvel Allred 
said he paid the Bank the $4,338.00 payoff "To protect this 
investment I had. What ~ ~ owed ~ and to get some collateral 
for this." (Tr. 192 emphasis added). 
Any residual question as to Arvel Allred's purpose 
in making the payoff payment is dispelled by the following 
colloquy from the transcript: 
Question [Mr. Felt] :You did pay this money to the 
bank to protect your investment in this truck; is this true. 
Answer [Arvel Allred] :That is true. (Tr. 193 
emphasis added) . 
Respondent believes the foregoing testimony refutes 
the argument of the bank that Kenneth Allred redeemed the 
truck relevant to the lawsuit. 
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I 
l 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I. THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT AND THE 
TRIAL JURY CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT-BANK DISPOSED 
OF THE 1972 MACK TRUCK IN A COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE MANNER: 
A. COMPETENT, SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
AT TRIAL SUPPORTED THAT FINDING 
B. APPELLANT OWED A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO 
PLAINTIFF TO DISPOSE OF THE COLLATERAL 
IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER. 
A. Competent, Sufficient Evidence Introduced at 
Trial Supported A Finding That The Defendant-Appellant Disposed 
Of The 1972 Mack Truck In A Commercially Unreasonable Manner. 
Evidence introduced at trial indicated that in 
November, 1972 the defendant Kenneth Allred and plaintiff-
respondent entered into a lease with option to purchase the 
1972 Mack Truck (Tr. 4, 7, Ex. 1-P). In a supplemental 
agreement of August, 1974 those parties agreed that if respondent 
paid a reduced sum of money from the original agreement, Maas 
would receive title to the truck. During the time plaintiff-
respondent had possession of the truck he made twenty-six 
payments on the truck directly to the defendant-appellant all 
of which were accepted (Tr. 10, 73, 82, 87, 91-92, 97). Mr. 
Maas told the Bank he had bought the truck from Allred. 
Respondent claims a Mr. Picket of the appellant-Bank accepted 
that fact (Tr. 15). Mr. Maas talked to Mr. Kotter of the Bank 
about title to the 1972 Mack and another vehicle (Tr. 16). 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff's wife normally made the payments to the 
Bank by enclosing the actual payment together with a payment 
coupon printed on the Bank's own form (Tr. 197). Plaintiff 
obtained the coupon book from Kenneth Allred (Tr. 80-81). 
At a minimum the Bank knew Mr. Maas had "operating rights" 
in the truck (Tr. 87, 267). 
After the appellant-Bank accepted the payoff from 
Arvel Allred, plaintiff testified Mr. Kotter told him "the 
truck had been sold." (Tr. 49). From the earlier quoted 
testimony of Kenneth Allred it is clearly his position that 
Arvel Allred' s payoff payment was not made at Kenneth's request 
or for his benefit (Tr. 127, 132). And Arvel said he made 
the payment to protect his own investment (Tr. 192, 193). 
The appellant-Bank, notwithstanding its knowledge 
that Maas was making payments on the truck, and notwithstanding 
its admitted awareness that Maas had operating rights to the 
truck, failed to give plaintiff notice of sale or disposition 
or opportunity to object (Tr. 50). It disposed of that truck 
for a sum less than one quarter of what the trial jury found 
the fair market value of the truck was (Tr. 190-191, R-320 
Answer to Proposition No. 8). 
Respondent respectfully contends that the above 
recited facts constitute evidence upon which a trier of fact 
could reasonably conclude that the defendant-appellant's 
disposition of the 1972 Mack truck was commercially unreason-
able. The finding of the trial jury and the holding of the 
majority of this court are both amply supported by the evidence 
-4-
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and should be sustained without reargument. 
B. Appellant Had A Legal Obligation to Plaintiff 
To Dispose Of The Collateral In A Commercially Reasonable 
~· 
Article Nine of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
both as it reads now and as it read at the time of the Bank's 
disposition of the 1972 Mack truck, clearly provides and 
provided that even a secured party can only dispose of col-
lateral if there has been a default. Utah Code Annotated 
70A-9-504(1) (1977 Supp.), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. The trial jury specifically found that the appellant 
Bank waived the three payments due on the promiss~ry note 
until the end of the business hours of the Bank on February 
28, 1975 (R-320; Proposition No. 7). It follows that if 
plaintiff was not in default, any disposition of the truck 
by the Bank would be wrongful, and, by definition, commer-
cially unreasonable. 
By habitually accepting payments from Maas the 
appellant Bank chose to substitute plaintiff for Kenneth 
Allred as the contract debtor. Section 9-504(3) of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code in its present form and in the form 
it existed at the time the Bank disposed of the truck required 
a secured party to give reasonable notice of public or private 
sale to the "debtor." And the version of 9-504(3) in effect 
in 1975 required that notice (except for consumer goods) also 
be given to "any other person who has a security agreement in 
the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement 
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indexed in the name of the debtor or who is known by the securec 
party to have a security interest in the collateral." 
Section 70A-9-105 (of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code defines "debtor" broadly. That version of the Code in 
effect in 1975 provided: 
'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or 
other performance of the obligation secured, 
whether or not he owns or has rights in the 
collateral, and includes the seller of accounts, 
contract rights or chattel paper. Where 
the debtor and the owner of the collateral 
are not the same person, the term 'debtor' 
means the owner of the collateral in any 
provision of the chapter dealing with the 
obli ation, and ma include both where the 
context so requires; emphasis added 
See also Section 70-9-lOS(d) (1977 Supp.), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Respondent respectfully urges that because the Bank 
habitually accepted payments from Mr. Maas, looked to him for 
payments, recognized his "operating rights" in the truck and 
generally acquiesced in his performance of the agreements 
which gave him use of that truck, it regarded Maas as, and 
Mr. Maas in fact was, a "debtor" within the meaning of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Mr. Maas was entitled to notice 
of and opportunity to bid in at the Bank's disposition of 
the 1972 Mack truck. 
Respondent further believes appellant's reliance 
on Section 70A-9-504, regarding a debtor's right to redeem, 
is misplaced. Indeed, that Section enforces this courts 
and trial jury's findings that a commercially unreasonable 
disposition occurred since plaintiff-respondent, as a debtor, I 
I 
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was entitled to a right to redeem which the Bank never gave 
him. Not only was the disposition or sale price of the 
1972 Mack grossly inadequate, but there was also an utter 
failure of respondent to give notice and opportunity to 
bid to plaintiff who was entitled to both. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority opinion of this court and the trial 
jury correctly determined that the appellant-Bank's dispo-
sition of the 1972 Mack truck was commercially unreasonable. 
Appellant's petition for rehearing should be denied. Further 
Respondent prays for his costs for filing his brie~ in answer 
to petition for rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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